INTRODUCTION
Argentina and Brazil are world leaders in agriculture; they have expanded production massively recently and have pioneered the adoption of agricultural technology intensive inputs. As natural resources (NRs) are becoming more knowledge intensive (Marin et al., 2015) an important development question is if these countries are taking advantage of their position as agricultural leaders, to develop linkages with knowledge intensive providers to this sector. The opportunity to develop knowledge intensive providers linked to NRs is attracting increasing attention of both researchers and policy makers due to the importance of this sector for the diversification of economies with a structure highly concentrated on NRs.
We focus on seeds. Seeds are a key strategic input for agricultural production. It is estimated that up to 50% of increases in agricultural production derives from improved seeds (FA, www.fao.org). Seeds used to be a quasi-natural, quasi-public good, which incorporated limited innovation.
However, with the recent changes in science and technology, they are becoming a knowledge-intensive product, embodying several knowledge intensive services. In this paper we are interested in understanding the extent to which the expansion of the agricultural sector in Argentina and Brazil, has created opportunities for advanced forms of domestic innovation in seeds.
Previous studies suggest that domestic enterprises and institutions in the region are playing a central role in the development of seeds innovations in the region (Marin et al., 2015; Marin and Stubrin, 2015) . The overall objective of this paper is to analyse the characteristics of domestic firm´s innovation in these two countries. More specifically, we are interested in understanding the share of domestic firms, their R&D strategy, how do they differ of those implemented by the large MNCs in the sector, the type of innovations they develop, with which kind of capabilities do they develop them, and which are the main factor that explain these innovations.
Research on innovation capabilities of firms from developing countries suggests that firms that successfully completed a process of capability building in these type of countries, typically followed a path that starts with the copy and replication of existing technologies developed by firms in advanced countries and, finishes with creative imitation and innovation, when firms from emerging economies start to be able to create completely new things (e.g. Katz 1987; Bell and Pavitt, 1996; Amsden, 2003; Hobday et al., 2004; Kim, 1980; 1991) . We explore to what extent this framework is useful to think technological capability building and innovation in NRs and activities linked to NRs.
To perform the analysis we complement quantitative and qualitative evidence. First, to provide a general overview of the evolution of the rate of innovation and the role of domestic firms in innovation, we analyse innovation data based on new plant varieties of soybean, maize, wheat, sunflower, cotton and rice registered in the National Registry of Cultivars (RNC) in Argentina and Brazil. Then, we use evidence of case studies and interviews to key actors to interpret the main trends observed and better understand successful firms´ strategies. We selected the three most successful regional firms (Don Mario/Brasmax, Nidera and Tropical
Melhoramento e Genetica (TMG)).
The analysis reveals some interesting patterns and results. First, innovation grew significantly in both countries. Second, it seems that there have been more opportunities for domestic firms´ to develop in Argentina than in Brazil, and in some crops than in others. Third, domestic successful firms have followed a trajectory of capability accumulation clearly different to the one followed by the foreign MNCs. In particular, a common feature of the domestic firms analysed is that they have been successful in serving a particular need of this market, the need for diversity. They have been able to do so, based on a strategy of providing fast response to the changing and diverse demands of farmers of the region. This has allowed them to outcompete MNCs in several markets, which are mostly oriented to deliver patented standardised solutions. We reflect on the implications of these results for theory and policy.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, after this introduction, we present the background of our research in two sub-sections. In the first one, we briefly provide, and discuss, some insights from the innovation literature regarding the understanding of the innovation process in firms from developing countries, and, in the second one, we analyse how innovation takes place specifically in the seeds industry and how this has changed recently creating new opportunities for innovation for firms in developing countries. In Section 3 we describe the data and methodology. In Section 4
we discuss the empirical evidence. This section includes two subsections. In the first one, based on the quantitative data we identify some general patterns about innovation in seeds in Argentina and Brazil. In the second we analyse the cases. We first describe the main features and characteristics of the firms studied and then discuss key aspects of their strategy, research efforts and innovation that explain their success.
BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH

Innovation opportunities for developing country firms
A vast body of research has focused on trying to understand how firms from developing countries develop technological capabilities (e.g. Katz 1987 , Bell and Pavitt 1996 , Amsden 2003 , Hobday et al 2004 , Kim 1980 , 1991 . This research suggests that for successfully completing a process of technological upgrading these firms typically followed a path that involved the following stages:
--First, the copy and replication of existing technologies developed by firms in advanced countries, generally facilitated by FDI and technology imports. At this stage activities almost exclusively consist of assembling foreign inputs to produce fairly standardized products.
--Second, incremental improvements to the original technology ("creative imitation").
--Third, innovation when firms start creating new products and processes.
Based on these ideas a great deal of research has been conducted about different mechanisms of technological learning and capability accumulations such as FDI, spillovers, imports, technology transfer, etc. (Lall, 1987 (Lall, ,2000 Amsden and Tschang, 2003; Hobday, et al 2004; Lee, 2013; Kim, 1980; Kim, 1991; Marin and Bell, 2006) . This model of upgrading, however, has been developed mostly based on the experience of technological learning in manufacturing industries. It is not clear, therefore, whether it is helpful to understand the processes of learning and innovation that takes place in NRs or in industries strongly linked to NRs.
NRs are different to manufacturing in many respects. They are by definition embedded in a territory with specific natural conditions (e.g. soil and climate, temperature, water conditions). This implies that knowledge produced in a specific location might not always work or be useful in another location.
Offshore oil technology developed for the Mexican gulf, for example, was not applicable in the northern sea where Norway´s oil was located (Andersen 2012 ). In addition, NRs activities deal with living matter which has its own specific characteristics. For example, Norway, despite being the most productive country in salmon fish farming, was not able to make cold fish farming work.
This closes down the possibilities for full replication at early stages of development of an industry, such as it happened in manufacturing, but opens up opportunities for innovation in different types of contexts and even for new directions of innovation. In Chile, specific local conditions encouraged the development of a whole set of local capacities, scientific, technological and institutional, after a sanitary crisis threatened the sustainability of the whole activity (Katz et al, 2011) . In the South African coal industry the presence of poor quality coal deposits with many impurities led to the development of advanced technological capabilities in the washing of coal.
New research needs to be carried out, however, to better understand the trajectories of technological learning and upgrading followed by firms from less advanced countries linked to NRs activities.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of this issue by analysing the technological trajectory of capability accumulation of firms in the seed industry in Argentina and Brazil.
Innovation specificities and possibilities in the seed industry
Historically, most seeds improvements were performed by the farmers themselves and public institutions. The process of improvement was mostly done by trial-and-error, i.e. plants with desirable traits were crossed and selection was based on human observation. Currently, however, a significant share of seed improvement is performed by firms and scientific institutions and the process of improvement has become more complex, involving the combination of genetic, biological and agronomical knowledge.
Three main phenomena explain these changes: a) the irruption of hybrids for some crops 1 (e.g. maiz), which meant that firms could more easily recuperate their investments 2 , b) the expansion of knowledge about genetics which enhanced the opportunities for seed improvement, and, lately, c) the increasing legal possibilities of private appropriation of plants via IPR.
A major consequence of these transformations has been the concentration of the seeds market. We suggest, however, that some recent changes in demand, knowledge and institutions are creating new opportunities for a diversity of trajectories in the seed industry, and for the increasing participation of domestic firms from less advanced countries (Marin and Stubrin 2015) . We summarized these changes below:
1 Hybrids are the result of the intentional cross-pollinitazation of two varieties of a plant. The offspring is an hybrid that contains the best traits of each of the parents. 2 Most plants are open-pollinating. That means that they keep their genetic attributes generation after generation. Thus, farmers can replant seeds from previous harvests without discernible losses in productivity. Hybrids, on the contrary, have the characteristic that they lose their genetic attributes in future generations. Therefore, farmers need to buy new seeds every season to maintain the improved traits of the original seed. The development of hybrid seeds help companies to recuperate the research and development costs more rapidly as appropriation of the benefits of innovation is guaranteed by hybrids´ seeds reproduction process. 3 In the 1970s, for instance, 50 US seed companies were acquired by MNCs (Fernando-Cornejo et al. 2002). a. Changes in demand are creating new and diverse niches § There has been an increase in the demand for agricultural products, which is expected to keep an upward trend in the next decades, due to a growing population 4 and an increasing demand for energy (FAO 2009 ).
There are a lot of pressures, thus, for agricultural production, most of which takes place in developing countries, to expand. Different types of innovations in seeds are crucial to improve agricultural yields 5, 6 and to expand agricultural production to new territories. § Farmers are becoming more specific in their demands for inputs (Kanungwe 2009 See, "Producing quality seeds means quality yields" (FAO), retrieved from http://www.fao.org/in-action/producing-quality-seeds-means-quality-yields/en/. 7 Some examples are: soybeans or maiz resistant to particular herbicides, Brussels sprout hybrids with uniform ripening and size that make them more suitable for machine harvesting and monogerm sugar beet varieties that reduce the need for laborious thinning and enable fully mechanized cultivation (Burnis 2009 The most acknowledged of these new opportunities is that of genetic manipulation. Genetic manipulation can be used to identify, isolate and transfer gene sequences with the purpose of providing seed varieties with a code for characteristics that are unknown within the same species. When genetic engineering involves the transfer of gene sequences from one species to another (e.g. using genes from bacteria to modify soy varieties), the plant varieties are known as transgenic plants.
The new opportunities opened by genetic manipulation has been mostly taken by large MNCs, the kind of companies that have the resources needed to both develop transgenic plants and patent and accomplish the biosafety regulations that are required for transgenic events.
Nevertheless the advances in molecular biology are also allowing to complement traditional phenotype selection (based on plants observable characteristics) with genetic information (genotype selection) making the breeding process -including the processes performed using classical breeding and mutagenesis (see Box 1) -more precise and efficient in general. The above mentioned changes in demand, S&T and IPR regulations, provide domestic seed firms in developing countries with new opportunities to innovate and compete in the seeds market. In the following sections, we analyse the extent to which these opportunities are being taken in Brazil and
Argentina by domestic firms.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use two types of evidence for the analysis: seeds´ innovation data of six crops (maize, soya, wheat, sunflower, cotton and rice) in two countries (Argentina and Brazil) and evidence from three case studies. We describe the data and the methodology used below. This data allowed us to identify main trends in seed innovation in Argentina and Brazil in the last decades. In particular, we use this data to unravel the rate of innovation in the six crops studied, the participation of different types of actors in seed innovation in each country, and to identify the introduction of transgenic innovations for some crops.
Our three case studies are Don Mario and Nidera, both from Argentina but that operate in both countries, and the company TMG from Brazil (see Table   1 ). We describe the main characteristics of each case briefly below: Source: Own elaboration.
We carry out at least one interview with a key informant of each of the study cases. Interviews were key to gather data about: firms` characteristics (history, main activities, type of products they offer, type of crops they improve, the technologies they master, the size of the firm, market share, exports, and internationalization), innovation activity (amount and type of R&D efforts, type of innovations achieved and the organization of the innovation activity), and appropiability issues (how the current IPR regime affect the firm`s innovation activity, which is the firm strategy to cope with the current IPR regulation).Data collected was used in the empirical analysis to better understand the strategies of successful firms to compete in the seed market, the type of technological capabilities they have, the sort of innovations they achieve and how they organize their innovation activity.
EMPRICIAL ANALYSIS
This section is organized in two parts. First, based on new plant varieties registered in the RNC we identify the main general trends in seed innovation in Argentina and Brazil. Second, we analyse the firms behind the data and their strategies.
Stylized facts: main innovation trends
During the last decades there has been a significant increase in the rate of seed innovation both in Argentina and Brazil. Note: 1 For the sake of the presentation of the data we did not show the number of new cultivars registered in Brazil in 1998, which were 815.
As a general trend, thus, it can be said that despite the differences in magnitudes, in both countries there has been a similar upward trend in innovation activity. • Domestic seed firms account for almost a half of all new seed varieties introduced in Argentina (47,95%) whereas in Brazil their participation is much more reduced (18,86%).
• Foreign firms explain the bulk of innovations in Brazil (57,69%) whereas they account for more than one third of innovations in Argentina (39,38%).
• Local PROs are more relevant to explain innovation activity in Brazil than in Argentina. They account for 22,19% of all innovations in Brazil and 5,72 per cent in Argentina. and Brazil (1998 Brazil ( -2013 Source: Own elaboration based on data from RNC in Argentina and Brazil.
On the whole this evidence tells us that domestic firms are more relevant to explain innovation activity in Argentina, and that in Brazil multinationals and PROs (mostly Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) 14 ) are more significant to explain innovation rates. However if we compare by crop (see Figure 5 ) we observe some interesting differences.
14 EMBRAPA is a Brazilian state company founded in 1973. The evidence there shows that:
-domestic seed firms in Argentina contribute to develop new seeds in a wider array of crops in comparison to Brazil. In Argentina domestic firms develop at least a third of innovations in rice, soya, maize, sunflower and wheat; whereas in Brazil domestic firms only do that on wheat and sunflower.
-local PROs in both countries perform a more central innovative role in rice and cotton. However, local PROs in Brazil also contribute significantly to innovation in soya and wheat.
-in both countries foreign firms concentrate their innovative efforts on crops that either provide high levels of appropiability (such as hybrids of maize and sunflower)and/or where it is possible to develop transgenic plants (cotton, maize and soya). However, this phenomenon is much more significant in the case of Brazil. In this country foreign firms have a stronger role in developing new seed varieties of soya than in Argentina. Something similar takes place in the case of maize and sunflower.
-it is important to notice, however, that in Brazil some of the foreign firms have Argentinean capitals (we will see more about this in the following subsection). Source: own elaboration.
In the next sub-section the analysis is focused on understanding the strategies that domestic seed firms pursue in Argentina and Brazil, and the type of innovations they are delivering.
The firms behind the data
This subsection is structured in three main parts. First, we provide an overview of firms´ main characteristics and strategies. Second we describe in detail firms´ innovation efforts. In the last part, we show which are the main innovations developed by these firms.
Overview of the main characteristics and strategy of the successful domestic firms
Actors in the seed industry can be distinguished according to the type of activities they perform. These activities include: plant breeding (developing seeds embodying improvements such as high yields, resistance to disease and pests, or traits specific to regional agroclimatic conditions), transgenic traits´ development (includes identification and isolation of genes from other species), seed production or multiplication, seed conditioning (consisting of drying, cleaning, sorting seeds, treating them with fungicides and packaging them for distribution and sale), and seed marketing and distribution. Actors vary between those that are fully integrated (performing from "plant breeding" to "seed marketing and distribution") and those that perform just one of the possible activities. Between this two extreme cases, there is a huge diversity of combinations: firms that perform plant breeding and develop transgenic traits, firms that perform plant breeding and multiply, firms that produce and condition seeds, and many others (see Figure 6 ). A key question is thus: how have they done so? What do they provide?
These companies do not develop transgenic events or multiply or perform seed´s conditioning or marketing. They dedicate entirely to develop genetic improvements using cross breeding assisted by modern biotechnology. Our analysis suggests that in doing so the companies analysed serve very well a particular and crucial need of the seed market, the need for diversity. 16 Asian rust is a serious disease caused by the fungus Phakopsora pachyrhizi and Phakopsora meibomiae. 17 The commercial name of the soybean ressistant to Asian rust is "Inox" and was launched in 2009. Domestic firms´ strategy is to develop innovations that respond to this need for diversity. That is, to develop seeds that adapt to multiple contexts responding timely to a diversity of farmers´ demands. These firms remain flexible to change their seed varieties over time responding to changes in the environment.
As pointed out by a key informant interviewed from Don Mario: "A key element of Don Mario strategy is positioning itself as a first mover (…). Don
Mario´s strategy consists of possessing a wide spectrum of seed varieties that are suitable for different climate and soil conditions as well as resistant to pests. Thus, Don Mario attempts to be the first that cater to the market with the type of variety that is more suitable for the problems or agroecological conditions of each year and region". A TMG key informant also asserts that: "Time-to-the market and diversification are the main strategies to compete in the seed market".
How do they provide diversity and adaptation? Domestic firms´ technological strategy.
As discussed above the domestic firms analysed do not develop transgenic events (see Box 1 for a description of the technologies available to develop seed innovations). This is due to several reasons: (i) they are very expensive to develop, not only for the traditional R&D costs, but also and mostly indeed, because of the regulatory and biosafety costs, (ii) this technology is not effective to deliver the number and type of innovations demanded by this market (see Box 2 for a more detailed explanation of the technical possibilities offered by this technology vs the others available); (iii) several markets do not receive well seeds that have been genetically modified using transgenic events.
Research on transgenesis concentrates mostly on looking for characteristics in other species that are unknown within a species (see Box 1). This is time consuming, risky and very expensive, and as said it is not well accepted in many markets. A proof of this is that only a few characteristics developed using transgenesis are in the market (resistance to herbicides and to insects).
For large MNCs is profitable to concentrate efforts on this particular technology because they have the resources and the capabilities to patent and defend the events within biosafety institutions and the public opinion.
Once they have done so, the existing IPR system allows them to recover the benefits of their innovations in multiple locations for long periods of time.
Transgenesis, however, is not effective to deliver the multiple innovations that the seed market requires to function well in different agro-ecological conditions. Domestic firms purposely develop seeds using the other two technologies available: cross-breeding and mutagenesis (see Box 1). They concentrate their innovation efforts thus on identifying the variability that exists within species -but that is unknown -to develop new varieties. This implies investing in efforts to identify and understand much better the genome and possibilities of specific species to adapt to different types of agro-ecological conditions and changes in the environmental conditions over time. And to do so they use advanced levels of biotechnology capabilities. For example, all the successful domestic firms studied use molecular markers 18 in the breeding process (we explain more of their R&D capabilities in the next subsection).
This type of biotechnological tools help firms to gain precision and shorten the breeding process.
The following quote from one of our interviewers at Nidera reflects the strategy of the company regarding their technological approach to innovate in seeds: "In sunflower, oil consumers are willing to pay a surcharge for quality, and also they are not in favour of acquiring seeds that have been modified by transgenesis. In this context, other technologies, such as mutagenesis, appear as a very helpful tool to improve sunflower, because they do not generates resistances or fears, and can generate traits. For example, Nidera generated 5 families herbicide resistance using mutagenesis" (see the next sub section for more examples of the kind of innovations that domestic firms deliver)".
When the "market" demands it, however, these firms acquire transgenic events through licenses with MNCs, and then paste them into their own developed plant varieties. This is the case in the market of soy, corn and cotton.
Box 2. Genetic engineering: an appraisal of results
Genetic engineering, and in particular the use of transgenesis -is often advertised as the most sophisticated and advanced of the technologies to improve existing seeds. These justifications are of two types. One is that genetic engineering can improve the process of seed innovation. The claim is that it is a more precise and efficient technique for improving seeds. The second is that the technology can improve the outcome of seed innovation. Both justifications deserve careful scrutiny. The first of these -that genetic engineering techniques will improve the process of seed innovation -is based, in large part, on the fact that genetic engineering is able to exploit advanced scientific knowledge in molecular biology. Yet, as many individual scientists and professional scientific associations are careful to acknowledge, the same bodies of advanced knowledge can be and are being used in cross breeding and mutagenesis, enhancing the speed and precision of innovation using those techniques too (Biochemical Society 2011). For example, the use of genomic techniques such as molecular marker assisted breeding significantly increases the precision and predictability of cross-breeding, and reduces the time involved in creating a new cultivar (Beddington 2010; Morrell et al. 2011; McCouch et al. 2013) . The claimed advantages of genetic engineering, in terms of improved processes, are not necessarily apparent in practice (Gepts 2002) .
As for the argument that genetic engineering can improve the outcome of seed innovation, it is striking how little evidence there is in support of that claim. Instead it is based largely on expectations about what the technology may be able to achieve in the future (e.g. Smith 2000) . For the time being, at least, the innovative outputs from genetic engineering can often be achieved with other approaches. Thus key traits achieved by genetic engineering -for herbicide tolerance, coleopteran pest resistance, bcarotene enrichment and delayed ripening -have all been introduced in major food crop varieties by advanced cross breeding and mutagenesis techniques (Arundel 2001; Zamir 2008; Brumlop and Finckh 2011) . Furthermore, genetic engineering techniques have not yet been able to modify complex 'quantitative' traits, such as for yield and stress resistance (that are determined by numerous interacting genes), but such traits can be modified using cross breeding techniques, especially when using advanced genomic knowledge (Fernie et al. 2006 ).
The evidence is conclusive in this respect. Transgenesis has been used to Box 2. Genetic engineering: an appraisal of results develop a few standardised innovations i.e. transgenic events that deliver a standard service (such as resistance to a particular herbicide) to all producers wherever they are located. These transgenic seeds are then inserted into seeds that are adapted different conditions.
Source: Marin et al, 2015
R&D organization
One common characteristic of domestic firms analysed is that they have generated a rich and diversified germplasm bank 19 and that have developed the capabilities to take advantage of it (through advanced capabilities in storing, classifying and reading genetic information) so to respond to market needs timely. We elaborate more about this below.
The size and diversity of the germplasm bank is the key asset of a seed firm. Imported germplasm introduces variability to the local germplasm bank, and can be highly beneficial in the innovation process. For instance, Nidera, was a first mover in importing French wheat germplasm to Argentina (Baguet) and adapt it to local requirements of quality. French wheat provided higher yields in comparison to the Argentinean wheat, but it had much lower quality for the local standards. Nidera, using cross breeding assisted by biotech tools, managed to upgrade the quality of French wheat and gained an important share of the domestic market. Another example is that of Don Mario, which started importing USA germplasm and adapting it to local conditions. Then the company started to develop its own germplasm, but it is still importing soybean germplasm from elsewhere (currently signed an agreement with the Chinese Science Academy to explore Chinese soybean germplasm). A key 19 A germoplasm bank can be defined as a collection of live plant matter in the form of seeds.
element in the strategy of these companies is the use of foreign direct investment and joint ventures, as a way not only to gain market, but also to broaden up its germplasm and to get to know the agro-ecological problems and solutions from other regions. TMG, for instance, has signed a partnership with the Dutch Mutagene, to obtain access to a higher number of genes.
To develop their own germplasm (and also to assess and incorporate foreign germplasm) these firms invest heavily in R&D. Don Mario has two labs, one in Argentina in Chacabuco, and the other in Londrinas, Brazil. Nidera has also two labs, one in Venado Tuerto, Argentina and the other one, in Uberlandia, Brazil. These labs assist the breeding programmes, in the case of Don Mario almost a 100% and in the case of Nidera a 60%, since the company develops also traits for sunflower using mutagenesis. In Nidera, 30% of the lab, thus, is dedicated to develop new traits. TMG has also a biotech lab dedicated to the development of molecular markers. In 2013 the company invested US$ 5 million to acquire the first robot that performs genotyping in South America.
To perform basic research (and to find and train human resources), these companies tend to have agreements with universities (i.e. to perform research on genetic mapping of their varieties). Don Mario has agreements with the University of Buenos Aires, the University of Rosario and the University of Londrina. TMG hires biotechnology laboratory services from Londrina and Maringa State Universities. In addition, it has an agreement for human resources training with Illinois and Iowa Universities in the US.
They also invest heavily in the development of capabilities (human resources and equipment) to read, and storage information out of their germplasm.
They have several agreements with universities and laboratories that help them to read this information.
However, the success of these firms is not only explained by the development and organization of genetic information, but on the exploitation of the synergies among: genetic information, the testing of genetic material and the use of greenhouses.
The experimental testing on the field is key to assess whether materials developed in the lab or in greenhouses perform well or not in different locations. Field testing demands high investments in specialized machinery and trained human resources (mostly agronomists) that are able to identify the best plants. Field testing takes several years.
The size and magnitude of the experimental testing, as well as the number of greenhouses that each firm has developed are key to explain the success of firms to develop timely better performing seeds. Tables 3 and 4 show the magnitude of the network of testing for maize and soybean of the companies analysed here, relative to the size of the network of two less successful companies ACA and Santa Rosa from Argentina for which data is available.
20 Table 3 focuses on maize, Table 4 on soy. The size of the experimental network (in number of plots) in Argentina of Nidera (20% of market) is 1500 times higher than that of ACA (5% market share). In addition, Nidera performs experimental work in other countries which is key to contribute to increase the variability and richness of its germplasm bank. 20 Due to the availability of data, here we focus only on the differences between the successful domestic seed firms studied, and others less successful ones regarding the scale of their field testing programes, However, firms also differ regarding other important dimensions such as their investment in R&D, sizes of their germoplasm banks, type of R&D equipment, among others. TMG is different from Nidera and Don Mario in this respect. TMG is a leading firm in Brazil, but it is more inward oriented. Hence, its network of testing is locally broad, but not that big in other countries. Source: Own elaboration.
In sum, the R&D strategy of the domestic seed companies that have succeed in this market is based on: a broad base of genetic diversity, heavy commitment to R&D activities, highly qualified personnel, world-class equipment and technologies, quality in selection and assessment (based on mechanisation, computerisation, etc.), a large and diverse scale of testing and agreements with other institutions to perform basic research.
Innovations
In this subsection we present some examples of innovations developed by the domestic firms analysed in Argentina and Brazil. These are divided into four types: i) changes in plants´ cycles, ii), resistance to diseases, iii) yields´ improvements, and iv) development of new non-GM traits. We provide some examples of each of them below. But more important than anything else, by advancing the period of maturation, these varieties allowed double cropping of soy and corn, which in Brazil has explained the boom in production of both crops during the last recent years (see Figure 9 ). 21 Something similar happened with the disease Southern Steam Canker (caused by Diaphorte phaseolorum f.sp. meridionalis) (SSC), a very destructive disease that caused severe damage in the years 1996-1998 (Wrather et al 2001 , Ploppler 2004 . Since then an intense breeding effort took place to obtain soybean varieties resistant to that disease. In 1997, the Argentinean company Nidera responded to this need of the market by launching five soybean varieties that were resistant to SSC. This is surprising with a world seed market increasingly concentrated in a few large MNCs that own almost all patented genes.
The case study evidence shows that the successful domestic firms analysed have followed a trajectory of capability accumulation clearly different to the one followed by MNCs. In particular, a common feature of the domestic firms analysed is that they point to serve a particular need of this market, the need for diversity. They sell diversity and speed of adaptation, not to one particular context, but to enter multiple contexts, which in agriculture is crucial because biology and needs change very rapidly. They have been able to do so, based on a strategy of providing fast response to the changing and diverse demands of farmers of the region. Some of the new characteristics or features embodied in the seeds that they have developed include shorter growing habits, resistance to specific diseases and climate conditions, higher yields, etc.
These firms do not use transgenesis not because they do not have the capabilities to do so, but mostly due to the high regulatory costs associated to this technology. Instead, they privilege flexibility, have invested in horizontal technologies, which can serve different types of innovations and, therefore, have less sunk costs and commitments to one particular innovation relative to the large MNCs (which put most of their efforts in selling and updating the few standardised innovations that have managed). This has allowed them to outcompete MNCs in several markets, even without patented innovations.
Interestingly, the strategy followed by these firms show clearly that firms in
NRs from less advanced countries do not follow a similar trajectory to the one followed by firms in manufacturing sector, based on copy, replication and improvement, at least for product innovation. They develop entirely new products every season to satisfy domestic specific demands. With this aim they use some standardised processes, but change them and create new ones. For example, domestic firms create their own molecular markers and their own ways to carry out field testing.
A key development question is, would these companies be able to survive in the next years and further expand? We identified three main restrictions these firms are facing: one is related to expectations, the other is related to regulations and the third is related to capabilities.
Regarding expectations, the huge expectations created around transgenesis, which is one of the existing technological possibilities to modify seeds, is inducing governments in developing countries to perform huge investments in the development of capabilities related to this technology. This does not necessarily constitute a problem for companies that are based in germplasm improvements, such as the ones analysed here. Nevertheless, financial resources are limited, R&D and other forms of support for the development of capabilities in seed genetic engineering means less resources available for alternative options (unless the capabilities can be applied generically across innovation approaches). Beyond that, it is not clear the extent to which these investments might capitalise in benefits. For developing country governments, the promise of highly profitable domestic seed firms specialising in transgenic seed innovation might be tantalising, but it is an option that in practice is unlikely to be available for all but the largest MNCs firms since the barriers to market entry (regarding IPR and biosafety regulations) are very high. Currently, in the soy market in Argentina, IPR asymmetries generate that MNC owner of the genes pasted in varieties developed in local germplasm, capture a great deal of the value of seeds, whereas domestic firms (Don Mario, for instance) capture a minority of the total value of seeds. There is no evidence, however, that shows that the way the rent is distributed among the different actors is related to their relative contribution to the total value of seeds.
In addition, the high barriers to entry into the "gene business", in which MNCs play a dominant position, generates that countries like Argentina, with a domestic seed market highly developed and domestic seed firms with advanced capabilities in breeding run the risk of both losing these local capabilities and transferring the ownership of local biological diversity (contained in germplasm banks owned by domestic firms) to large MNC (Nidera for instance was during the time of this project sold 51% to Chinese capitals). This is an important challenge for agricultural countries´ policy.
Finally, regarding capabilities, it seems clear from the analysis that further expansion of the domestic companies analysed requires that they develop not only scientific and conventionally understood technological capabilities. This is because they need to adapt to the changing and demanding regulations and institutions that characterise these industries. Accomplishing IPR and biosafety regulations, for example, can be important obstacles for these types of firms to compete and survive in this market.
Governments seeking to support local natural resource-based companies need to set up the right institutions and regulations (such as those related to IPR or market concentration) and need to support the creation of knowledge and skilled workers and supportive infrastructure that is more adequate to the domestic capabilities. But to do so they need to have a broad understanding of the industry and an informed view about its future prospects.
